MCP's OAuth scoping undermined by static API key proxies
A developer reports that many agent CLIs still store static API keys in environment variables, creating a large blast radius if leaked. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) aims to fix this with scoped OAuth consent per tool, but half of the servers examined simply proxy a static key, defeating the purpose.
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